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唐朱昌
唐朱昌
教授,博士生导师。复旦大学中国反洗钱研究中心首任主任,复旦大学俄...
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陈浩然
陈浩然
复旦大学法学院教授、博士生导师;复旦大学国际刑法研究中心主任。...
何 萍
何 萍
华东政法大学刑法学教授,复旦大学中国反洗钱研究中心特聘研究员,荷...
李小杰
李小杰
安永金融服务风险管理、咨询总监,曾任蚂蚁金服反洗钱总监,复旦大学...
周锦贤
周锦贤
周锦贤先生,香港人,广州暨南大学法律学士,复旦大学中国反洗钱研究中...
童文俊
童文俊
高级经济师,复旦大学金融学博士,复旦大学经济学博士后。现供职于中...
汤 俊
汤 俊
武汉中南财经政法大学信息安全学院教授。长期专注于反洗钱/反恐...
李 刚
李 刚
生辰:1977.7.26 籍贯:辽宁抚顺 民族:汉 党派:九三学社 职称:教授 研究...
祝亚雄
祝亚雄
祝亚雄,1974年生,浙江衢州人。浙江师范大学经济与管理学院副教授,博...
顾卿华
顾卿华
复旦大学中国反洗钱研究中心特聘研究员;现任安永管理咨询服务合伙...
张平
张平
工作履历:曾在国家审计署从事审计工作,是国家第一批政府审计师;曾在...
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India’s measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing

 

https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/India-MER-2024.html

 

India has achieved a high-level of technical compliance across the FATF Recommendations and has taken significant steps to implement measures to tackle illicit finance. Nevertheless, it is critical that the country continues to improve its system as its economy and financial system continue to grow, in particular ensuring that money laundering and terrorist financing trials are completed and offenders are subject to appropriate sanctions; and taking a risk-based and educative approach with non-profit organisations.

 

A joint FATF-APG-EAG assessment of the country’s measures to tackle illicit Finance concludes that India has implemented an anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) framework that is achieving good results, including on risk understanding, access to beneficial ownership information and depriving criminals of their assets. Authorities make good use of financial intelligence and co-operate effectively, both domestically and internationally.

 

India is the largest country in the world by population and has the largest diaspora. It is a lower-middle income country with one of the world’s fastest growing economies that is currently the world’s fifth largest economy. India’s main money laundering risks originate from illegal activities within the country, these risks relate primarily to fraud, including cyber-enabled fraud, corruption and drug trafficking. India pursues money laundering related to fraud and forgery in line with predicate crime risks to a large extent, but less so with some other offences such as human trafficking and drug trafficking. The country needs to address the backlog of money laundering cases pending conclusion of court processes.

 

India faces serious terrorism and terrorist financing threats, including related to ISIL or Al Qaeda. India as a strong emphasis on disruption and prevention and has demonstrated its ability to conduct complex financial investigations. However, India needs to focus on concluding the prosecutions and convict and appropriately sanction terrorist financiers.

 

The country needs to ensure that measures aimed at preventing the non-profit sector from being abused for terrorist financing are implemented in line with the risk-based approach, including by conducting outreach to non-profit organisations on their terrorist financing risks.

 

India has made significant steps in financial inclusion, more than doubling the proportion of the population with bank accounts, encouraging greater reliance on digital payment systems, and making use of simplified due diligence for small accounts. These efforts have supported financial transparency, which in turn contribute to AML/CFT efforts.

 

Despite the size and institutional complexity of the Indian system, Indian authorities cooperate and coordinate effectively on matters dealing with illicit financial flows, including the use of financial intelligence. India also achieved positive results in international co-operation, asset recovery and implementing targeted financial sanctions for proliferation financing.

 

Indian authorities also have a comprehensive understanding of the money laundering, terrorism and proliferation financing risks but need to do more to share insights on these risk across all relevant stakeholders.

 

There is a good understanding of risk and application of preventative measures in the financial sector, especially by commercial banks, although less so by some other smaller financial institutions.

 

Financial Institutions are taking steps to apply enhanced measures to politically exposed persons (PEPs), however, India needs to address the issue of lack of coverage of domestic PEPs from a technical compliance perspective and ensure reporting entities fully implement these requirements. Implementation of preventative measures by the non-financial sector and virtual asset service providers, and supervision of those sectors, is at an early stage. India needs to improve implementation of cash restrictions by dealers in precious metals and stones as a priority given the materiality of the sector.

 

Following the assessment, India is placed in “regular follow-up” and in line with procedures, will report back to the Plenary in three years.